tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29442238.post115280503377203818..comments2023-10-08T06:15:15.581-05:00Comments on Hagia Sapientia: Thomas Aquinas on Divine IncomprehensibilityThomashttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14449969414952273164noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29442238.post-1153152489461096702006-07-17T11:08:00.000-05:002006-07-17T11:08:00.000-05:00Dr. D., I make a distinction between the question ...Dr. D., <BR/><BR/>I make a distinction between the question of an eternal creation and the problem of divine freedom/simplicity. <BR/> <BR/>According to one of the historic arguments for an eternal world God’s will is eternal, but He wills the existence of the world, thus the world must be eternal. There are other supporting premises in this argument as Aquinas outlines it in ‘De Aeternitate Mundi’ and the ‘Summa Contra Gentiles’. His refutation, however, is – in my opinion – final. He simply points out that there is no reason to deny that God can will from eternity a world in which there was a first movement and thus a first movable thing and thus a first moment. He could also have willed a world in which there was no first movement and thus no first moveable thing and thus no first moment.<BR/><BR/>According to Aquinas’s most advanced interpretation of this aspect of the problem – which constituted a genuine ‘via media’ between the Augustinians of the 13th c. who contended for a demonstration of first movement (Bonaventura, Kilwardby, Tempier) and the Radical Aristotelians or “Latin Averroists” (Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia and later John of Jandun) who argued for a demonstration of eternal movement, although they professedly accepted on faith [except possibly the last] the Church’s teaching on the temporal beginning of the world – neither an eternal nor a temporal world can be demonstrated (i.e. is rationally necessary). The Christian then assents to it on the basis of divine revelation, i.e. by faith alone (STh I., q. 46, a. 1 & 2). <BR/><BR/>The relationship between divine freedom and simplicity – and the problems attached to it – is not intrinsically linked to the question of the temporal character of the world.Thomashttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14449969414952273164noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29442238.post-1153100878890386162006-07-16T20:47:00.000-05:002006-07-16T20:47:00.000-05:00How does such square with divine simplicity, in th...How does such square with divine simplicity, in that all such distinctions ultimately break down? Perhaps I'm not following your logic.Dan Dunlaphttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15610718122774026303noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29442238.post-1153078939929173132006-07-16T14:42:00.000-05:002006-07-16T14:42:00.000-05:00Dr. D.,St. Thomas on several occasions responds to...Dr. D.,<BR/><BR/>St. Thomas on several occasions responds to this exact objection, e.g. in the ‘De Aeternitate Mundi.’ Essentially he argues that there are two kinds of agents: natural and volitional. A natural agent is a cause with respect to its nature. A volitional agent is a cause with respect to its will. God is a cause in the second sense. God could will an eternal world but he has willed a temporal one, or at least so says divine revelation.Thomashttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14449969414952273164noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29442238.post-1152932465814013382006-07-14T22:01:00.000-05:002006-07-14T22:01:00.000-05:00Thomas, if God is "pure act," then what's to preve...Thomas, if God is "pure act," then what's to prevent one from employing something akin to the old argument for God's eternal Fatherhood (i.e., if God is Father then he must be so eternally, and thus Christ is eternally begotten) in support for an eternal act of creation? In other words, if God is Creator than he must be eternally so, and thus the world is eternal?Dan Dunlaphttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15610718122774026303noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29442238.post-1152836854273352232006-07-13T19:27:00.000-05:002006-07-13T19:27:00.000-05:00Plotinus distinguishes between essence and activit...Plotinus distinguishes between essence and activity which form at least the basis for the latin construals of essence and being. A better candidate for precedent with THomas would be Proclus. In any case, Plotinus seems just fine with thinking of the One in terms of activity, specifically an infinite activity, making it incomprehensible. Simplicity for Plotinus implies infinity and incomprehensibility. This is why the One generates an infinite world and that which is infinitly many, matter.Acolyte4236https://www.blogger.com/profile/06247421363309732839noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29442238.post-1152822821405781422006-07-13T15:33:00.000-05:002006-07-13T15:33:00.000-05:00acolyte, Perhaps. It would depend, it seems, upon...acolyte, <BR/><BR/>Perhaps. It would depend, it seems, upon whether Plotinus makes use of the same distinction between essence and 'esse' as does St. Thomas.Thomashttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14449969414952273164noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29442238.post-1152821371271846402006-07-13T15:09:00.000-05:002006-07-13T15:09:00.000-05:00I wonder why then Plotinus calls the One energia o...I wonder why then Plotinus calls the One energia or esse. Hmmm I think you may have Thomas right, but I think you have Plotinus wrong.Acolyte4236https://www.blogger.com/profile/06247421363309732839noreply@blogger.com